|Commenced in January 2007||Frequency: Monthly||Edition: International||Paper Count: 2|
In a parliamentary system, party discipline is the impulse; when it falls short, the government usually falls. Conceivably, the platform of Indian politics suffers with innumerous practical disorders. The politics of defection is one such specie entailing gross miscarriage of fair conduct turning politics into a game of thrones (powers). This practice of political nomaditude can trace its seed in the womb of British House of Commons. Therein, if a legislator was found to cross the floor, the party considered him disloyal. In other words, the legislator lost his allegiance to his former party by joining another party. This very phenomenon, in practice has a two way traffic i.e. ruling party to the opposition party or vice versa. The democracies like USA, Australia and Canada were also aware of this fashion of swapping loyalties. There have been several instances of great politicians changing party allegiance, for example Winston Churchill, Ramsay McDonald, William Gladstone etc. Nevertheless, it is interesting to cite that irrespective of such practice of changing party allegiance, none of the democracies in the west ever desired or felt the need to legislatively ban defections. But, exceptionally India can be traced to have passed anti-defection laws. The politics of defection had been a unique popular phenomenon on the floor of Indian Parliamentary system gradually gulping the democratic essence and synchronization of the Federation. This study is both analytical and doctrinal, which tries to examine whether representative democracy has lost its essence due to political nomadism. The present study also analyzes the classical as well as contemporary pulse of floor crossing amidst dynastic politics in a representative democracy. It will briefly discuss the panorama of defections under the Indian federal structure in the light of the anti-defection law and an attempt has been made to add valuable suggestions to streamline remedy for the still prevalent political defections.
The objective of this paper is to analyze the role played by the institute of the public hearings in the Brazilian Supreme Court. The public hearings are regulated since 1999 by the Brazilian Laws nº 9.868, nº 9.882 and by the Intern Regiment of the Brazilian Supreme Court. According to this legislation, the public hearings are supposed to be called when a matter of circumstance of fact must be clarified, what can be done through the hearing of the testimonies of persons with expertise and authority in the theme related to the cause. This work aims to investigate what is the role played by the public hearings and by the experts in the Brazilian Supreme Court. The hypothesis of this research is that: (I) The public hearings in the Brazilian Supreme Court are used to uphold a rhetoric of a democratic legitimacy of the Court`s decisions; (II) The Legislative intentions have been distorted. To test this hypothesis, the adopted methodology involves an empirical study of the Brazilian jurisprudence. As a conclusion, it follows that the public hearings convened by the Brazilian Supreme Court do not correspond, in practice, to the role assigned to them by the Congress since they do not serve properly to epistemic interests. The public hearings not only do not legitimate democratically the decisions, but also, do not properly clarify technical issues.