|Commenced in January 2007||Frequency: Monthly||Edition: International||Paper Count: 16|
Game theory is the study of how people interact and make decisions to handle competitive situations. It has mainly been developed to study decision making in complex situations. Humans routinely alter their behaviour in response to changes in their social and physical environment. As a consequence, the outcomes of decisions that depend on the behaviour of multiple decision makers are difficult to predict and require highly adaptive decision-making strategies. In addition to the decision makers may have preferences regarding consequences to other individuals and choose their actions to improve or reduce the well-being of others. Nash equilibrium is a fundamental concept in the theory of games and the most widely used method of predicting the outcome of a strategic interaction in the social sciences. A Nash Equilibrium exists when there is no unilateral profitable deviation from any of the players involved. On the other hand, no player in the game would take a different action as long as every other player remains the same.
The performance of any cooperative communication system depends largely on the selection of a proper partner. Another important factor to consider is an efficient allocation of resource like power by the source node to help it in forwarding information to the destination. In this paper, we look at the concepts of partner selection and resource (power) allocation for a distributed communication network. A type of non-cooperative game referred to as Trade-Off game is employed so as to jointly consider the utilities of the source and relay nodes, where in this case, the source is the node that requires help with forwarding of its information while the partner is the node that is willing to help in forwarding the source node’s information, but at a price. The approach enables the source node to maximize its utility by selecting a partner node based on (i) the proximity of the partner node to the source and destination nodes, and (ii) the price the partner node will charge for the help being rendered. Our proposed scheme helps the source locate and select the relay nodes at ‘better’ locations and purchase power optimally from them. It also aids the contending relay nodes maximize their own utilities as well by asking proper prices. Our game scheme is seen to converge to unique equilibrium.
The performance of state of the art worldwide telecommunication networks strongly depends on the efficiency of the applied routing mechanism. Game theoretical approaches to this problem offer new solutions. In this paper a new continuous network routing model is defined to describe data transfer in fixed telecommunication networks of multiple hosts. The nodes of the network correspond to routers whose latency is assumed to be traffic dependent. We propose that the whole traffic of the network can be decomposed to a finite number of tasks, which belong to various hosts. To describe the different latency-sensitivity, utility functions are defined for each task. The model is used to compare router and host intelligent types of routing methods, corresponding to various data transfer protocols. We analyze host intelligent routing as a transferable utility cooperative game with externalities. The main aim of the paper is to provide a framework in which the efficiency of various routing algorithms can be compared and the transferable utility game arising in the cooperative case can be analyzed.
This paper deals with stakeholders’ decisions within energy neutral urban redevelopment processes. The decisions of these stakeholders during the process will make or break energy neutral ambitions. An extensive form of game theory model gave insight in the behavioral differences of stakeholders regarding energy neutral ambitions and the effects of the changing legislation. The results show that new legislation regarding spatial planning slightly influences the behavior of stakeholders. An active behavior of the municipality will still result in the best outcome. Nevertheless, the municipality becomes more powerful when acting passively and can make the use of planning tools to provide governance towards energy neutral urban redevelopment. Moreover, organizational support, recognizing the necessity for energy neutrality, keeping focused and collaboration among stakeholders are crucial elements to achieve the objective of an energy neutral urban (re)development.