Open Science Research Excellence

Open Science Index

Commenced in January 2007 Frequency: Monthly Edition: International Paper Count: 10

10
10005019
Improving the Management Systems of the Ownership Risks in Conditions of Transformation of the Russian Economy
Abstract:
The article analyzes problems of improving the management systems of the ownership risks in the conditions of the transformation of the Russian economy. Among the main sources of threats business owners should highlight is the inefficiency of the implementation of business models and interaction with hired managers. In this context, it is particularly important to analyze the relationship of business models and ownership risks. The analysis of this problem appears to be relevant for a number of reasons: Firstly, the increased risk appetite of the owner directly affects the business model and the composition of his holdings; secondly, owners with significant stakes in the company are factors in the formation of particular types of risks for owners, for which relations have a significant influence on a firm's competitiveness and ultimately determines its survival; and thirdly, inefficient system of management ownership of risk is one of the main causes of mass bankruptcies, which significantly affects the stable operation of the economy as a whole. The separation of the processes of possession, disposal and use in modern organizations is the cause of not only problems in the process of interaction between the owner and managers in managing the organization as a whole, but also the asymmetric information about the kinds and forms of the main risks. Managers tend to avoid risky projects, inhibit the diversification of the organization's assets, while owners can insist on the development of such projects, with the aim not only of creating new values for themselves and consumers, but also increasing the value of the company as a result of increasing capital. In terms of separating ownership and management, evaluation of projects by the ratio of risk-yield requires preservation of the influence of the owner on the process of development and making management decisions. It is obvious that without a clearly structured system of participation of the owner in managing the risks of their business, further development is hopeless. In modern conditions of forming a risk management system, owners are compelled to compromise between the desire to increase the organization's ability to produce new value, and, consequently, increase its cost due to the implementation of risky projects and the need to tolerate the cost of lost opportunities of risk diversification. Improving the effectiveness of the management of ownership risks may also contribute to the revitalization of creditors on implementation claims to inefficient owners, which ultimately will contribute to the efficiency models of ownership control to exclude variants of insolvency. It is obvious that in modern conditions, the success of the model of the ownership of risk management and audit is largely determined by the ability and willingness of the owner to find a compromise between potential opportunities for expanding the firm's ability to create new value through risk and maintaining the current level of new value creation and an acceptable level of risk through the use of models of diversification.
9
10003848
Funding Innovative Activities in Firms: The Ownership Structure and Governance Linkage - Evidence from Mongolia
Abstract:

The harsh realities of the scandalous failure of several notable corporations in the past two decades have inextricably resulted in a surge in corporate governance studies. Nevertheless, little or no attention has been paid to corporate governance studies in Mongolian firms and much less to the comprehension of the correlation among ownership structure, corporate governance mechanisms and trend of innovative activities. Innovation is the bed rock of enterprise success. However, the funding and support for innovative activities in many firms are to a great extent determined by the incentives provided by the firm’s internal and external governance mechanisms. Mongolia is an East Asian country currently undergoing a fast-paced transition from socialist to democratic system and it is a widely held view that private ownership as against public ownership fosters innovation. Hence, following the privatization policy of Mongolian Government which has led to the transfer of the ownership of hitherto state controlled and state directed firms to private individuals and organizations, expectations are high that sufficient motivation would be provided for firm managers to engage in innovative activities. This research focuses on the relationship between ownership structure, corporate governance on one hand and the level of innovation on the hand. The paper is empirical in nature and derives data from both reliable secondary and primary sources. Secondary data for the study was in respect of ownership structure of Mongolian listed firms and innovation trend in Mongolia generally. These were analyzed using tables, charts, bars and percentages. Personal interviews and surveys were held to collect primary data. Primary data was in respect of corporate governance practices in Mongolian firms and were collected using structured questionnaire. Out of a population of three hundred and twenty (320) companies listed on the Mongolian Stock Exchange (MSE), a sample size of thirty (30) randomly selected companies was utilized for the study. Five (5) management level employees were surveyed in each selected firm giving a total of one hundred and fifty (150) respondents. Data collected were analyzed and research hypotheses tested using Chi-Square test statistic. Research results showed that corporate governance mechanisms were better and have significantly improved overtime in privately held as opposed to publicly owned firms. Consequently, the levels of innovation in privately held firms were considerably higher. It was concluded that a significant and positive relationship exists between private ownership and good corporate governance on one hand and the level of funding provided for innovative activities in Mongolian firms on the other hand.

8
10002666
Ownership, Management Responsibility and Corporate Performance of the Listed Firms in Kazakhstan
Abstract:
The research explores the relationship between management responsibility and corporate governance of listed companies in Kazakhstan. This research employs firm level data of selected listed non-financial firms and firm level data “operational” financial sector, consisted from banking sector, insurance companies and accumulated pension funds using multivariate regression analysis under fixed effect model approach. Ownership structure includes institutional ownership, managerial ownership and private investor’s ownership. Management responsibility of the firm is expressed by the decision of the firm on amount of leverage. Results of the cross sectional panel study for non-financial firms showed that only institutional shareholding is significantly negatively correlated with debt to equity ratio. Findings from “operational” financial sector show that leverage is significantly affected only by the CEO/Chair duality and the size of financial institutions, and insignificantly affected by ownership structure. Also, the findings show, that there is a significant negative relationship between profitability and the debt to equity ratio for non-financial firms, which is consistent with pecking order theory. Generally, the found results suggest that corporate governance and a management responsibility play important role in corporate performance of listed firms in Kazakhstan.
7
10000868
The Effects of the Corporate Governance on the Level of Internet Financial Reporting: Evidence from Turkish Companies
Abstract:

Internet financial reporting and corporate governance issues are in the focus of academic and professional studies due to their attributed importance by stakeholders of corporations. Major aim of this study is to reveal the relationship between internet financial reporting which is held as dependent variable and some indicators of corporate governance such as the ratio of managerial ownership, blockholder ownership, number of independent members in the board of directors, frequency of meetings by audit committee and education level of audit committee members which are held as independent variables. Main purpose is to reveal the effect of corporate governance on the voluntary efforts of Internet Financial reporting. The scope of the research is limited to the Turkish Corporations listed in Borsa Istanbul (Istanbul Stock Exchange) and findings which are generated by means of SPSS software are revealed in results section and interpreted in conclusions.

6
9999235
Legal Arrangement on Media Ownership and the Case of Turkey
Abstract:

In this study, we will touch upon the legal arrangements issued in Turkey for prevention of condensation and for ensuring pluralism in the media. We will mention the legal arrangements concerning the regulatory and supervisory authority, namely the Radio and Television Supreme Council, for the visual and auditory media. In this context; the legal arrangements, which have been introduced by the Law No 6112 on the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises and Their Media Services in relation to the media ownership, will be reviewed through comparison with the Article 29 of the repealed Law No 3984.

5
5617
The Effect of Ownership Structure on Stock Prices after Crisis: A Study on Ise 100 Index
Abstract:

Using Turkish data, in this study it is investigated that whether a firm’s ownership structure has an impact on its stock prices after the crisis. A linear regression model is conducted on the data of non-financial firms that are trading in Istanbul Stock Exchange 100 Index (ISE 100) index. The findings show that, all explanatory variables such as inside ownership, largest ownership, concentrated ownership, foreign shareholders, family controlled and dispersed ownership are not very important to explain stock prices after the crisis. Family controlled firms and concentrated ownership is positively related to stock price, dispersed ownership, largest ownership, foreign shareholders, and inside ownership structures have negative interaction between stock prices, but because of the p value is not under the value of 0.05 this relation is not significant. In addition, the analysis shows that, the shares of firms that have inside, largest and dispersed ownership structure are outperform comparing with the other firms. Furthermore, ownership concentrated firms outperform to family controlled firms.

4
9997070
Corporate Governance, Shareholder Monitoring and Cost of Debt in Malaysia
Abstract:

This paper attempts to investigate the effect of corporate governance and shareholder monitoring mechanisms on cost of debt of Malaysian listed firms. We assess the quality of corporate governance using comprehensive corporate governance index, which consists of 139 items in six broad categories. We classify shareholder monitoring mechanisms into concentrated ownership, family, insider and government ownerships. Using panel sample from 2003 to 2007, regression results show that high corporate governance quality and concentrated ownership lower firm cost of debt. Debt issuers consider board structure and procedures, board compensation practices, accountability and audit, transparency and social and environmental activities as integral components of a good corporate governance framework.

3
14377
Corporate Governance Practices and Audit Quality: An Empirical Study of the Listed Companies in Egypt
Abstract:

Recent financial international scandals around the world have led to a number of investigations into the effectiveness of corporate governance practices and audit quality. Although evidence of corporate governance practices and audit quality exists from developed economies, very scanty studies have been conducted in Egypt where corporate governance is just evolving. Therefore, this study provides evidence on the effectiveness of corporate governance practices and audit quality from a developing country. The data for analysis are gathered from the top 50 most active companies in the Egyptian Stock Exchange, covering the three year period 2007-2009. Logistic regression was used in investigating the questions that were raised in the study. Findings from the study show that board independence; CEO duality and audit committees significantly have relationship with audit quality. The results also, indicate that institutional investor and managerial ownership have no significantly relationship with audit quality. Evidence also exist that size of the company; complexity and business leverage are important factors in audit quality for companies quoted on the Egypt Stock Exchange.

2
4833
Firm Ownership and Performance: Evidence for Croatian Listed Firms
Abstract:
Using data of listed Croatian firms from the Zagreb Stock Exchange we analyze the relationship between firm ownership (ownership concentration and type) and performance (ROA). Empirical research was conducted for the period 2003-2010, yielding with the total of 1,430 observations. Empirical findings based on dynamic panel analysis indicate that ownership concentration variable - CR4 is negatively related with performance, i.e. listed firms with dispersed ownership perform better than firms with concentrated ownership. Also, the research indicated that foreign controlled listed firms perform better than domestically controlled firms. Majority state owned firms perform worse than privately held firms but dummy variable for privately controlled firms was not statistically significant in the estimated panel model.
1
12634
The Effect of Board Composition and Ownership Concentration on Earnings Management: Evidence from IRAN
Abstract:
The role of corporate governance is to reduce the divergence of interests between shareholders and managers. The role of corporate governance is more useful when managers have an incentive to deviate from shareholders- interests. One example of management-s deviation from shareholders- interests is the management of earnings through the use of accounting accruals. This paper examines the association between corporate governance internal mechanisms ownership concentration, board independence, the existence of CEO-Chairman duality and earnings management. Firm size and leverage are control variables. The population used in this study comprises firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) between 2004 and 2008, the sample comprises 196 firms. Panel Data method is employed as technique to estimate the model. We find that there is negative significant association between ownership concentration and board independence manage earnings with earnings management, there is negative significant association between the existence of CEO-Chairman duality and earnings management. This study also found a positive significant association between control variable (firm size and leverage) and earnings management.

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